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In the Supreme Court of the State of Utah 
UTAH COPPER COMPANY, 
a Corporation, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs. 
STEPHEN HAYS ESTATE, Inc., a 
Corporation of Utah, JULIA 
HAYS HOGE, STEPHEN J. 
HAYS, LAWRENCE J. HAYS, 
MRS. LOU GOREY, MRS. ETH-
EL V. REILLEY and MARY 
LOUISE O'DONNELL, 
Defendants and Appellants. 
No. 5302 
Appellants' Answer to Petition 
for Rehearing 
Respondent's petition for rehearing IS inaccurate 
from the very beginning. The opening sentence contains 
a misstatement. It is not true that respondent "respect-
fully" petitions for a rehearing. 
The court is under no obligation to convince the re-
spondent. If the court decides the issues in accordance 
with the law and the facts it has pc~rformed its entire 
duty. Respondent in its brief attempts to usurp the 
functions of the court and to determine the facts and 
announce the law. It is for the court with all of the 
evidence bdore it and a knowledge of the law, after 
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considering the opposite contentions of the litigants to 
define the true nature and legal effect of the action 
brought by the respondent and to say who has "mis-
construed" and ~who has "overlooked" and whether or 
not the effect of the action brought by the respondent 
would be to obtain title to copper solutions owned by the 
appeHant. The court has the power and the duty to 
protect its dignity and restrain its officers within the 
bounds of decent respect and professional propriety, 
and we cannot refrain from the suggestion that if the 
lofty superiority manifest in the presentation of the re-
spondent's contentions had been transmuted into an ap-
preciation of the fundamental prineipl~::~s involved in this 
controversy, it would have been more in keeping with 
the dignity of the profession and the duty of the advo-
cate, and there can be no mistake that the suggestion in 
respondent's brief (page 7 4) that respondent is solici-
tous that the decision of the court "in this cause be un-
derstood and approved by all after sober analysis," 
while a generously professed suggestion, is in fact lim-
ited to a poignant urge that the decision be made to 
conform to the interests and desires of the respondent. 
The petition for r<>hearing filed by respondent is a 
studied insult to the court and to the appellant and 
strongly indicates the impossibility of respondent ap-
preciating the significance and weight of facts or law 
which would deny to it "a great industry," anything it 
demands regardless of the rights of others whom re-
spondent cannot refrain from describing as anything 
but "an interloper" (page 7). 
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\Ve turn to the points attempted to be raised by 
the petition for rehearing. 
I. 
Respondent's point I. is not a point. It would make 
absolutely no difference in this case whether respondent 
dumped its overburden in the surrounding gulches as 
waste or whether they entertained some intention that 
the Almighty would cause meteoric waters to fall upon 
the dumps and that they would give off into the sur-
rounding country some solutions which respondent might 
perchance collect. Respondent's purpose in this alleged 
point is to attempt to take a general statement by the 
Chief Justice, regardless of its materiality, and criticize 
it in the hope that thereby the decision in this case may 
be weakened. They feel that it is better to argue some-
thing, be it ever so immaterial, which they regard as 
vulnerable rather than to attack the real questions in 
the case. 
However, the Chief Justice was right and respon-
dent is wrong even in this immaterial matter. It is 
clearly inferable from the record that this low grade 
copper ore was dumped, at least originally, as waste, 
with no thought of treatment to extract therefrom what 
small quantities of copper were contained therein, ex-
actly as the Chief Justice said. 
Respondent's first dump, according to the record 
in the case, was in Ingersol Gulch which was commenced 
in 1907 (Abs. 124) and the first precipitating tank built 
by respondent for the systematic commercial precipita-
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tion of copper was in 1927, the yc~ar following that in 
which the dump in Dixon Gulch was commenced. J. D. 
Schilling, mine superintendent of the Utah Copper Com-
pany, testified (Abs. 126) that this over·burden is placed 
in these gulches "primarily to get rid of it and possibly 
secondarily so we can treat them by tlw It-aching pro-
cess.'' 
No one tE~stified that the occurrence of copper solu-
tions in Dixon Gulch was as much the deliberately plan-
ned result of "plaintiff's elaborate preparation therefor 
as the production of copper coneentrates is the carefully 
calculated aceomplishment of plaintiff's milling opera-
tions" or that it is a "manufactured product as are the 
concentrates from plaintiff's mills." No ·witness testi-
fied that plaintiff deposited material upon that site "for 
the purpose of oxidizing and lc~aching it'' by processes 
"for many years employNl successfully by plain tiff in 
the leaching of i.ts many other dumps." Sueh stat<~mc•nts 
by counsel in the petition for relwaring are not only at 
variam~e with the rec·ord in this ease and a figment of 
imagination, but are uttPrly lac~king in truthfuhwss, and 
since re>spondent has seen fit to go outside of the rec·ord 
for the purpose of misdesc·ribing this situation we take 
the libc~rty of quoting the following from the 1928 report 
of the Utah Copper Company ( h\·o years after the 
dumps in Dixon Guleh were started) made to its stoek-
holders and the public~ (sec> page 9): 
"In the last annual report mention was made 
of the fact that the capping removed since incep-
tion of opPrations and deposited on surface ad-
Jmmng the mine had oxidized to a point where 
meteoric waters were dissolving a very appreci-
able amount of copper. These percolating waters 
average about 15 pounds of copper per thousand 
gallons. There was leached in this way during the 
year and deposited in improvised precipitating 
plants 1,933,235 net pounds of copper at a cost of 
6.2 cents per pound. Profiting by this experience, 
a large central precipitating plant has been erect-
ed at a point low enough to receive all such water~ 
carrying copper in solution that are not tributary 
to the smaller plants. 
In connection with this it is interesting to 
realize that the large yardage of capping, for·-
merly rejected as worthless, now promises a cop-
per production of approximately one billion 
pounds-assuming a 70«fo recovery as possible.'' 
We have examined th(~ annual n~ports of t~e plain-
tiff for many years prior to the institution of this action. 
Though these reports contain references to removal of 
"overburden," 'Yhich is also referred to as "stT·ippings" 
and "cappings" and the reports of 1925, 192G and 1927 
refer to "small tonnage" and "small poundage" recov-
ered in form of precipitates from "m,ine waters," limit-
(~d to the open cut mine of the plaintiff, thPre is abso-
lutely no reference to the dumps as a sourcE~ of possible 
copper solutions, and all of these death-bed dE~clarations 
whieh would make Hw dumps the principal source of 
expected values is just so much attempt to read back 
into the past an appreeiation of the dump, whieh n(~ver 
existed and whieh was as mueh a :mrprise to the plain-
tiff as to c>veryone else in thP mining distriet and for 
whieh thc> plaintiff ha(lllPWr tnkPn nny steps to prc>pare. 
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So much for this alleged point and so much for the 
value which may be placed upon such bold statements 
of respondent. The floundering desire of rcespondent in 
its present desperate straits to find some straw to grasp 
should not lead those with short memories into attempt-
ing to take others to task for claimed inaccuracies. The 
veil of charity should be drawn over this portion of 
counsel's brief in the hope that it was said in ignorance. 
In support of respondent's contention that respon-
dent has always had in view the recapture of copper so-
lutions, reference is made to Exhibit 36, a water filing 
application in the office o-f the State Engineer, dated 
June 11, 1926. It will be noted, however, and this is 
significant, that the plaintiff hy that application sought 
to file on its own water and not on public water, and 
on such waters, not after such waters had entered the 
land of anoth<~r, but on its own land and in its own 
dump. No one in all the history of this litigation has 
ever contended that the plaintiff does not have a right 
to capture its own wat<~rs in its own dump, and it is only 
because plaintiff now contends that it has a right to 
capture the ddendants' watt~r on the dd<~ndants' land 
that w<~ have this dispute. At the time exhibit BG was in-
troduced counspl for plaintiff expressly repudiated any 
suggrstion that they attempted to found any right there-
on (see Abs. 200). No our has attempt<~d to limit plain-
tiff's right to captnn~ eopp<~r solutions ·\Yhile in the 
dmnp. 'l'lw pm;itiou of tlw defendants has always been 
that it made no diff<~rence what plaintiff intended as to 
eoppt•r solutions, that thP law preclicatcs no rights on 
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mere intention unconnectNl with capture and control. 
I may intend anything I want with regard to water in 
the clouds or descending from the clouds, and <~ven with 
waters in my own land, but unless I capt1tre and control 
the U)aters while in my land such intention in and of 
itself amounts to absolutely nothing whatever. This 
·whole matter is discussed on pag(~S 5 to 11 of "Respon-
dent's Reply to Appellants' Reply Brief" and its rein-
sertion in the petition for rehearing is just thrashing 
of old straws as to which we are entitled to an end. 
\Vhen the filing in the office of the State Fjngineer, 
Exhibit 36 (Abs. 342, 345) was offered in evidence by 
plaintiff th(~ court sustained defendants' objection there-
to as a basis of any right. Paragraph 9 of the filing is 
in the record becausP defendants subsequently offered it 
for the purpose of sho·wing that the exhibit indicates 
that r(~spondent in 1926 understood the law to be that 
respondent must capture any copper solutions it elaimed 
while in its dump in ordPr to own them, and that they 
then figured they could capture all of their waters on 
their own land at the point of div<~rsion, th(~ west en-
trance to the drain tunnel. This old point is disenssed 
at length in Respondent's Brief, pages 6 to 11, and in 
Appellants' Reply to Respondent's Brief, pages :-lO to 33. 
II. 
Respondent's second point lS worded m; follows: 
"The judgment in condemnation relates back to the or-
der to occupy cnh~red .June 13, 1928 and hy that judg-
ment no wat(~rs ·were nor (•ouhl any watPrs he eond<•mn-
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ed." Respondent reiterates its old saw that "all opin-
ions in this case are that until the copper solutions had 
crossed the boundary between the property of the plain-
tiff and that of defendants, title to these solutions was 
in plaintiff." Title in what sense'? The right to capture 
on its ovYn ground the waters therein and to exclude 
others from its own ground. The same right appellants 
have and ~which they assert in this action. Respondent 
has never squarely faced and always evades this issue. 
Title to water is not an absolute, unqualifiPd one, as is 
ordinarily the case with property, but has that peculiar 
inherent, ineradicable quality ~whieh attaches to water, 
its migratory incident whieh limits mYnership to the 
right to capture and take into possession while on one's 
property and burdened with the penalty of a termination 
of ownership the instant it leaves such property. It is 
also true that the order of eondemnation entered on 
.June 13, 1928 cmtld not aff.ect title to any water-. Plain-
tiff's pleadings do not eover tit]P to watN and the trial 
eourt hns n~pudiatecl any pnrpose of giving plaintiff 
title to water; and plaintiff should he compelled to stand 
on its plPaclings and on its declaration and should not be 
permitted to a(•quire wat(•r through aequiring land. If 
~we forget for a moment that this controversy concerus 
water in \Yhich there is a small quantity of copper, 
which is immaterial as far as the law of waters is con-
cerned, and considPr tlw situation of an ordinary con-
troversy about water, would a person at a higher level 
through ~whosP ground water must percolate or flow be 
pPrmitted for one instant to urgP to a court that he had 
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a right to condemn thE~ land of a neighbor at a lower 
level from which he intended to take water in the future 
because the water he would take in the future was not 
at the time of filing the suit in the land sought to be 
condemned o? There can be no question that such a sug-
gestion would have any support from the authorities or 
the court. vYhEm the order of condemnation was entered 
on June 13, 1928 even on the theory of the respondent 
there were certain solutions then in the tract condemned 
which belonged to the appellant. \Ye make no particular 
point as to the value of these solutions, their value is 
negligible, but in that instant there was potentially in 
the tract which rc~spondent was attempting to condemn 
all of the water which in all of the years to come will 
reach that particular tract, and it was this water acquir-
ing capacity that the plaintiff was attempting to secure, 
\Yithout paying anything for it. Tjand docs not produce 
water in any sense, so that it is poor science and poor 
logic for plaintiff to urgP that the dumps produc~e an~r 
\Yater. The dumps produce no more water than did the 
drainage district prior to the location of the dumps. Re-
spondent in its brief says, ''On .T nne 1:1, 1928 when plain-
tiff by court order was put in possession of thE> ease-
ment it sought to condemn, title to the solutions yet to 
eross that property was in plaintiff." This statement 
as a matter of fact and of law is inaccurate and highly 
mislPading. Only an infinitPsimal part of thP solutions 
were thrn owned by the plaintiff in that limited sense 
only in which solutions may be ownE•d-thc right to cap-
hue on one's own land. Practically all of such solu-
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tions which were yet to cross that property existed only 
in potential character, the elem<mts being scattered al-
most throughout the universe. Someday through laws 
of nature moisture would be created, precipitation would 
take place upon the water shed which wat<~r would find 
its way by seepage and percolation into appellants' land. 
Respond<~nt by its action seeks to preempt and patent 
for its exclusive ownership the laws of nature and these 
products, and to appropriate to itself those processes 
and bounties. It is ridiculous to talk about the respon-
dent owning all of these solutions at the instant the order 
of condmnnation was signed. As respondl'nt says, they 
were not all in existenc0 in th0 dump, and whl'n for a 
brief time they mingled with the materials in the dump 
respondt>nt would have the opportunity of capturing 
them on its own land, hut only for that brief time, and 
only during such brief moments would rnspond0nt have 
any kind of own('rship, and the instant such waters cross-
ed into appellants' land appellants would have the same 
fleeting opportunity of capture and p(~rfedion of mYn-
ership. Rc•spondent could not acquire by condemnation 
of app<~llantli' land a right to (•apture solutions which 
respondeut had failed to eaptnre on its own land and 
which could only have a real ownership by capture awl 
would belong to the ownPr of the land in whi(•h it was 
captured. Respondent should be eompelled to eat its 
own theory. 'l'hat theory is that respondent is not by 
this adion att0mpting to quiet title to waters but only 
to land. Respondent (•an not, then•fon~, acquire in la \\" 
or fad thP right to cnptun~ wat<•r aft("!' the same 
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leaves its land. ~What respondent is attempting to do is 
to avoid the limitation on the ownership of water, which 
restricts the right to capture to one's own land, by ac-
quiring the right to capture water mYned by the appel-
lant because such water actually is captured on appel-
lants' land, whereas it never has been captured in re-
spondent's land. 
This alleged second point is an old friend. It has 
been with us from the beginning. It has been thrashed 
back and forth until it is threadbare. The defect, as we 
think, in respondent's position is that respondent refuses 
to recognize the fact that owrwrship of water of this 
character is not absolute, but qualified and is bound 
by strong legal ties to the owner of the land through 
~which it is passing. A man cannot say that he owns 
\\'ater unless he reduces it to possnssion and controls it 
upon his premises, and it is a figment of the imagina-
tion to suggest that the respondent has r0duced to pos-
session meteoric waters which fall on the dump and then 
permitted to escape into adjoining land. Such waters 
are at all times on their way to he owned in the absolute 
sense only by thos~) who capture thC'm in a literal and not 
in a figurative sense. Other~wise vYe an) reduced in the 
last analysis to a conclusion that waters belong to the 
owner of the land at the highest elevation in the water 
shed, and that such highest owner may suceessfully con-
demn the land of all lower owners and eapture waters 
thereon simply on proof of probability that such waters 
fall on awl pass through his land. Such a doctrine has 
no plaee in the law. You cannot apc>x water. 
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~Whether appPllants have or lwvP not th0 right to 
compel the contimwd passage of these ~waters is not in 
this case, and we sec 110 reason for crossing that bridge• 
in this case, but it is important and vital that the funda-
mental doctrine of the law relating to waters that it is 
migratory and not stationary, the same as wild animals 
and other liquids and gases, and is mvned only in a quali-
fied sense, ~which is principally a right to capture on 
one's own ground and not absolutely until actually re-
duced to possession be adhered to, and sueh fundamental 
law ought not to be overthrown simply because "a great 
industry" regards ih; neighbor on a lower level ~who 
elaims equal right to water on its lands, as an "inter-
loper." This being tru0, an order giving respondent 
possession of appellants' land without prejudiee and 
only until a determination of the issues, does not change 
the ownership of th<~ \Yater coming into appellants' land 
any more than it ehanges the ownership of the land. 
Land and water arc one. App0llants ask for no differ-
ent title to the water than they are willing to eoncedl\ 
to the respondent, hnt insist upon equality. It is con-
eeivable that a l'itnation might arise where the n~spon­
dc~nt would own a dump at a lo\ver level than souw otiH•r 
dump at a higher level owned by some othc~r mining 
eompany and w<~ ean eoneeive the indignation of respon-
dent if n•quin~d to dc·fencl itself against the argumcuts 
usc~d hy respondent in this ease~ were the ownc•r of the 
dump at a higher levd attempting to eondemn rcspon-
d<'Jlt's clump. "There should he nothing 1wenliar ahont 
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the law applicable to its (Dixon Gulch) waters." (P. 39 
of the Petition for Rehearing). 
The law is the same as to all, great and small, above 
and below, as to such migratory elements. The order of 
condemnation did not change th<~ relations of the parties 
at all as far as title to water is concerned. The respon-
dent still had the right to capture the water in its dump 
and still lost such right to that \Vater as soon as it passed 
from respondent's dump. The respondent by the order 
of possession without prejudice preliminarily and only 
until the matter was determined by the court was given 
the right to go upon appellants' land and as a trustee, 
under the duty to act as the court should hold if the order 
of condemnation was not in accordance with law, and in 
such capacity to take possession of the water in appel-
lants' land. Otherwise, the order of condemnation be-
comes exactly what respondent repudiates, a transfer of 
title, and which respondent admits could not be its legal 
effect. 
Respondent says "we do not desire, it is not our 
purpose to acquire title to the coppnr solutions owned 
by the appellants," but the reply of the court is, "it 
makes no diffenmce what you declare your desire or 
purpose to be, the legal effect of upholding your con-
tention is to transfer title of copper solutions belonging 
to the appellants to the respondent, if we uphold the 
right of the respondent to condemn the land of the ap-
pellants and collect the copper solutions on appellants' 
land.'' 
It has al-ways S(~emed to us a mockery of justice to 
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suggest that the order of condemnation was equivalent 
to the miracle of the Red Sea whereby the waters seep-
ing and percolating from higher levels to lower levels 
were for that magical instant of the signing of the decree 
stopped in th<~ir course and Tract D became bone dry 
so that the condemner stood on nothing but earth and 
having acquired only the dry land, so as to cause the 
waters which thereafter came from the higher level to 
belong to th<~ condemner thereof. \V e know of no de-
eision supporting any such doctrine and not a single 
case from any court so holding has respondent been able 
to produce, and as stated before, the logic of tmch a law 
would b<~ to ultimatt>ly and finally decree the ovvnership 
of water to be in tlw person at the highest level so that 
he could by the tric·k of conclmnnation aeqnire Uw right 
to follmv the water once in his land when:ver it might 
go, under the fidion that at the instant the orclt~r of con-
demnation is being signed the natural laws governing the 
downward emus<~ of ~watPr are suspended and thereby 
the conclemrwr acquires only land, so that the right to 
water ::mbs<~quently appearing in the condemned land 
eontinuc~s in the cond\·mner then~of, sueh water being 
there eaptmed physically and actually for the first time. 
Such a sophistry in our judgment sweeps away the very 
foundatio11 of the law of water rights, and all migratory 
substances. 
Respondent prd<>nds to find difficulty in the sug-
gestion of tlw Chid .Justice that the effect of upholding 
the right of condemning in this ease would be to con-
dPlllll watc'r heeause, says n~spondPnt, the water which 
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it is claimed would be condemned under such circum-
stances are not y<~t in existence. This is equivalent to 
saying that when a person condemns a piece of land 
because of the water right attached to the land, they 
should be required to pay only for the land and the 
water physically in the land at the instant of condem-
nation, because the water which ·will be in the land next 
year is now in the ocean or in the clouds or it may be 
in land far distant at a higher elevation. \Vhen you 
condemn land to collect water on the land you condemn 
the capacity of the land to aequire water and that ca-
pacity exists, not in the actual pres<>nce of water at the 
instant of condemnation, but in tho probability that 
water naturally and according to the laws of gravitation 
will reach such land, and can there be captured or used, 
and the condemnation action in this case is subject to 
no different incident. 
The respondent pretends to suggest that it is pos-
sible to shut off the copper solutions before they reaeh 
the appellants' land. On the trial the respondent took 
two inconsistent positions on this question. It was first 
suggested that it would be easy and comparatiwly in-
expensive so to do, and whPn the appellants then argued 
that if it was easy and comparatively inexp<msive then 
their good faith in seeking thiR relief was open to ques-
tion, respondent took the other stand and insisted that 
it would be from an <~ngineering standpoint impossible 
to shut off the solutions, both beeause of the expense and 
berause of the fact that the waters were seeping and 
perrolating, and henc<• fliffuRed and not Ruhj<>d to col-
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lection. Now, in thrir petition for a rehearing, we have 
the argument that because the court has announced a 
doch·ine as old. as the hil1s that you 1nust eapture 
water on your own land before it is yours, that in this 
particular case, because this universally applicable lavv 
applies to the respondent, that since th(~y could do this, 
therefore, the court should uphold the order of condem-
nation because it would bP an idle thing to compd n•-
spondent to actually run the tunnel to the face of its 
dump and th<~re collect the waters. The trouble with 
the argument is that the owner of water does not C<~ase, 
by n~ason of the fact that the court may point out how 
the respondent may not lose title to water, to lose title 
by permitting the vYater actually to <~scape into tlw lan<ls 
and premises of others. If n~spondent can so easily cap-
ture the water upon its own premises, let it do so 
and end the controversy. 'l1he very n~ason it has 
sought this remedy is because, as stated in the argument 
under Point V, tlwre were waters in tlw gulch before 
th<~ dump was placed therr, which obviously are not from 
the dump and cannot, th<~refore, be captured in the dump. 
The vvaters in Dixon Gnleh are not all from this "reduc-
tion worb;" as now fina1ly admitt<~cl in Point V-just 
as apprllants han~ always contended-an<l for this rea-
son they have sought to take appellants' land inst<~ad of 
capturing their portion of such eomingh•d waters upon 
their own land, as thry now say it will be merely a gr:,;-
ture to do. \Y e invite this Rolution of the problem. 
It may produce cold chills of horror down the back 
of !hP rPspo])(kut hut thP law is that PVPry drop of \YatPJ' 
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reganllc>ss of wheth<~r it be blessed with some copper or 
cursed with sulphur or salt, is held only by a defeas-
ible right and the ownership of the respondent is strictly 
limited by the necessity of physically capturing and con-
trolling the same while it is actually in the dump. Each 
particle of wat<~r has stamped on it by fundamental lmv 
the basic scientific doctrine of evolution - use me 
now at least to th<~ extent of actually capturing me 
while on your land, or lose m<:~. Each drop of water in 
respondent's dump is ticketed for an ultimate destina-
tion beyond the ownership of the respondent and unless 
it is actually captured this right of ownership is actually 
lost. 
After having taken the coppPr solutions of the de-
femlauts for ov<~r six years and excluding the defen-
dants from the possibility of tlwmselvPs taking their 
own copper solutions on their own ground, it comes with 
poor claim from the illegal appropriators to suggest 
that the owner of th<~ copp<~r solutions would nc>ver have 
used them anyway. Hespondent is obs<~ssed with the 
strange hallucination that to get an order of oeeupancy 
is the end of eontroversy, wh<~reas in fact an order of 
occupancy in a ease of eminent domain is one which the 
condemner is under strict duty of justifying. For this 
purpose a bond is requirt>d, so that in caR<~ the order is 
not legally issued the ownPr of the property ·will b<~ abl<~ 
to seeure damages arising from the condud of the plaill-
tiff \vhih~ lw under authority of lav\- oeeupies the prop-
Prty. 'l'he occupier is a trustee. He must account for all 
that lw dop~; and everything that he take:-;. If the <'otut 
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holds, as it has in this case, that the property cannot be 
condemned, and in the meantime the occupier has taken 
from the premises valuable property of the owner, he 
must respond in damages. The order of occupancy does 
absolutely nothing in the way of interfering with title 
and it is idle for the respondent to suggest that an order 
secured ''without prejudice'' had the effect of transfer-
ing title to solutions then or thereafter to be in the de-
fendants' land, which the plaintiff admits would have 
belonged to the defendants had the order not been en-
tered. It is a beautiful theory, but we have never felt 
that it could impose itsPlf upon the court. 
\Ve sympathize deeply with the inability of the re-
spondent to r<~concile the opinion of the eourt in this 
ease with respondent's theory. The pain which respon-
dent feels in this matter is due to the fact that respon-
dent has never been able to admit wisdom, logic, or law 
in any position that did not support respondent's con-
tentions. 'l'ht> perplexity ·which respondent professes 
does not arise from the absence of either elear statement, 
sound logic, or abundant authority in support of the 
opinion of the court, hut because that opinion does not 
support the position of respondent. This difficulty is 
inherent and int~radicahle and if re:-;pondent ·would ree-
ognize this necessary divergence and its ineseapablP 
quality, it would :-;ooner show a respectful attitud<' to-
ward the functions of the court and recognize that when• 
court and counsel differ, it is the court and not counsf'l 
that decides. 
In the dee is ion of this court, discussc>d on pagP ] 2 
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of Respondent's Petition for Rehearing, respondent is 
confronted vvith the proposition that eminent domain 
does not permit the respondent to take appellants' land 
for the purpose of doing exactly what the appellants 
have the right to do and will do. In other words, eminent 
domain is not for the purpose of monopolizing mining 
and is not operative to exclude the appellants so that the 
respondent enn take values which appellants have the 
right to tah. Again we have the argument that respon-
dent could not rightly be ht>ld to he attempting to inter-
fere with the right of the appellants to collect eopper 
solutions in the future because such copper solutions 
were not in c~xistence at the time the order of occupancy 
was entt>red, but that the order of occupancy would per-
mit the rt>spon<lent to collect such copper solutions in 
the future on the land of th~~ defendants when such cop-
JWr solutions reach such land in the future. There is a 
failun~ on the part of respondent to recognize that what 
the court is dealing with is a right to collect and not with 
actual, specific, identified, actualizt>d drops of water. 
This is because of the~ peculiar eharaetnr of rights in 
water, as hereinbefore discussed. Rt>spondent again re-
fers to its contention that the owner of Tract D can have 
no right to a continued flow as to the future~ c•opper 
solutions fro111 a higher level. Defendants are not asking 
in this emw for a right to a eontinued flow. A right to 
a c~ontimwcl flow was not an issue in this ease. It is a 
right to eo11Pct on their land the water that actually per-
eolates aml appears then•. Appellants claim the owner-
ship of a pn•se11t right c~xtc•nding through all time to 
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collect waters that percolate, ~eep, or flow in Trarts C 
and D, and it is this right that the respondent is attempt-
ing to take away and is attempting to support by the 
sophistry that the court cannot deal with the right to 
collect 1vater in the futurP because the water is not now 
in the~ land. \Ve defend no rights diffenmt from tho~<~ 
of the plaintiff and we demand a recognition of the samo 
rights in our own land. This issue is presc>nted by ap-
pellants' answer and has been raised at C'Very oppor-
tunity, and the la\\- is without dissent, as arguc~d in the> 
briefs heretofore presented. 
'rhe respondent is unable to see, so respondent says, 
what the court refers to in its opinion where it is helcl 
that eminent domain will not he operative where prop-
erty is "being held or devoted to a public usc• by one 
person," and "may not be taken by eminent clomain 
proeec~dings, as a general rule, by another to be nsecl 
for the ~ame purpose in the same manner." Is it, says 
the respondent, the "ea~ement" or the "c·opper solu-
tions" to which the court refc~rs as being at presc>nt 
us eel g And respondent Rays, "we think it should IH• 
elcar that it is not copper solutions, because• there wer<· 
none." Perhaps the court might take the responclc~nt ai 
its o1vn word, and permit the respondc•nt to comktml 
the dry land at 'rraet D, hut not to collect any solntion:-: 
on or in that tract but to turn such solutions owr to tlJ<• 
clc~fendants. The respondent would promptly reqtwst a 
darification of such an order so as to permit it to eollec·1 
and take appellants' water for itsPlf. 'I' he> sallw is 
tnw with n'gard to t}w ~mggestc~d 1mcPrtaiuty as to thu 
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easement. Of course, with regard to the easement, "no 
one had theretofore suggested that the public use for 
which Tract D was being ht'ld by tho defendants was the 
conveyance of the plaintiff's solutions from plaintiff's 
dumps to defendants' facilities, there to be appropri-
ated by defendants, and that that prospective 'publie 
use' precluded plaintiff's condemnation of such an ease-
ment for the conveyance of the solutions plaintiff had 
produced to plaintiff's facilities, the result of its indus-
try and investment to be thereby retained as its own." 
No one has suggested such a proposition because the 
entire suggestion is simply an absurd concoction of. the 
respondent, and is easily resolved and dissipated by the 
basic fact that solutions in Tract D never have, do not 
no\\T, and never will belong to or be owned by the plain-
tiff. They inhere in and are a part of Tract D, and the 
right to capture and control is the very essence of the 
ownership of Tract D. 
Tracts C and D were, however, being used by appel-
lants at the time of the commencement of this action for 
the passage of appellants' solutions, with thE~ ch~ar, un-
ahandoned and unforfeited right of eapture by appel-
lants, whieh is exactly what respondent desires to take 
away and use for exactly the ~;;am(~ purpose. 
\Ye respectfully suggest that the eonrt should not 
fpe} any n~sponsihility for the professed incapacity of 
the l'(~spond(•nt to comprehend the proposition that while 
the respond(•nt has always professed that it was not at-
temptiug in any degree to acquire~ title to <'Opper solu-
tions by thP condemnation of the defendants' land that 
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in law and in fact such would be the effect of the success 
of the respondm1t in this case. It makes no difference 
what respondent declares. \Ve are not interested in the 
name that respondent shall give to what it is attempting 
to do. The question is what would be the aetual and the 
real effect of condemning Tract D under the guise of a 
mere easement and turning it over to respondent to col-
h~et copper solutions therein. If plaintiff's success in 
its efforts would not be in legal effect and reality a 
transfer of title to copper solutions in Tract D there is 
no such thing as ownership of water and the appellants 
in this case in turn could legally seek an order condemn-
ing an easement into respondent's dump to there col-
led copper solutions on the theory that such solutions 
are not nmv in existence and, therefore, cannot now be-
long to rpspondent, since the right to collect solutions 
would lw iu IW way associated with the ownership of 
land; aud appellants could in turn say that a decision 
. of a question which does not conform to the views of 
the re:,;pon<lent is incomprehensible to n~spondent and 
''we must say, with all due respect, is beyond our com-
prehension, as we think it will be beyond the under-
standing of all others who may be called upon to analp;(• 
or constnw this opinion." This is not the law relating 
to water and we arc sure will never become such. 
\Vhen we read respondent's analysis "pleadings j n 
this case and eonsidering the issue raised,'' we are n•-
minded of a statement by the late Senator Ben Tillman 
of South Carolina in the Senate of the United Stat<~~;, 
whPn lw 1<aid "I do not eare how much the eolored man 
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votP::;, just so you let the white man count tlw vot<~::;." H 
is an idlc> thing to have pleadings if \H~ are to permit the 
n~::;pondent to bP the only one to interpret them. 'l'he 
affirmative ans\Yer of the defendants covers pages GG to 
(i4 of th<~ Abstraet. It is not confined to the issue that 
the watPr claimed by the ddendants arise::; from distant 
and dec·p subtl•rTanPan som·<·es, (though a geologi<·al 
i::;sue raised hy the dd<~ndants made such a contention), 
but in the pleadings the irreducible issue always insist<·d 
upon was that from whatever original sources the ~wat<•rs 
eanw when they a(•tually reaelwd 'l'ract D they wer<' own-
t>d by the defendants. (See paragraphs XII and XIII of 
defendants' answer, Abs. 47-51, and the further answer 
and count<~relaint set forth at pages G6 to G4). 'I' he real 
issue was that ownPrship \Yas not confilH'd to origin but 
to location when captured, and the suggestion that there 
was no issue that the defendants intended to use 'L'raet D 
for the same purpose that the n•s]1ond<~nt would use it, is 
utterly false. Tract D aud 'I'ra.et C, as we will point out 
und('r another heading of this brief, are both of the!ll 
s i tu~l tPd strat<'gieally at the a nly point where a ppt~llants' 
wate1·s <'all he <'Oll<~et('d in Dixon (}uleh on defPndants' 
ground, and Uw respondent is attempting to mislead ill<~ 
court in its sugg<•t>tion that the objection made by th<> 
appellantt' in this aetion is not and has not always he<>ll 
thai tlH• n•spondent \Yas not att<~mpting to obtain nn 
<~a:c:<'tlH'Jtt l>ut that such atte111pt was merely a guise undPr 
\':hidt th<~y \n~n~ att<~mpting to acquire the only land on 
,., llid1 npp('l]ants' solutions ean be captured in Dixon 
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Gulch, and thus actually get for itself these waters by 
taking appellants' land. 
It is a misstatement as to the position of the court 
for respondent to say in its brief (page 21) that the 
opinion of the court must be founded on a contention 
that "the solutions here involved were th<~ result of a 
comingled supply from many unknown sources, coming 
to the surface of defendants' property within Tract D 
from subterranean and unknown sources." It is title, 
not source, that was the principal bone of contention on 
the trial, though most of the tim<~ was spent on geolog-
ical issues not involved in the appeal; and title was not 
depcmll'nt upon source. Anu the suggestion that th<~ de-
fense pleadeu to the taking of Tract D was not that th(' 
defendants intenueu to put 'l'ract D to the same use a:-; 
respondent is also inaccurate. Among other places see 
defendants' answer, page 62 of the Abstract, as follows: 
wrhat if the plaintiff is permitteu to conuemn and to 
usc aml occupy the ucfcndants' saiu property, as set 
forth in plaintiff's complaint * * * plaintiff will damage 
the uefcnuant in many thousanus of uollars * * * aJHl 
will prevent uefcndant from collecting its waters in said 
gulch containing copper in solution and extrading tlw 
(•opper therefrom • * • " 
III. 
Point three is bas<~d on the fact that plaintiff ha:s 
ousted defendants during six years from the possibility 
of collecting the defendants' copper solutions in Dixon 
Gnlf'h, and say:,; therpfore dcf<mdants should not he JWl'-
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mittcd to assert that defendants intend to usc the Tracts 
C and D for the same purpose plaintiff would use them, 
and thcrefon~ plaintiff ought to be permitted to exer-
cise the right of eminent domain; that the likelihood of 
defendants collecting copper solutions in Dixon Gnleh 
is very remote and the court should not refuse the Pxer-
cise of th0 power of eminent domain simply because the 
owm~r of land may at some remote and indefinite and 
uncertain time desire himself to use the land for a puhli<· 
purpose. 
Respondent goes outside of the n~cord to say that 
the Valentine Scrip was entered as an agricultural an<l 
not a mineral entry, but it makPs no difference. Under 
the law th<'n existing, which rights are now pn~s<>rw~d, 
the mineral rights belong to the patentee, and no issue~ 
was presented with reference then'to for decision by llw 
eourt. Respondent says (page 24 of its brief) "Under 
tlH~ findings in this case which this eourt has affirme<l, 
\\'ere a dam to be construc-ted across Dixon Guleh on 
lwdroek, 'rraet D would forthwith lweome dry, all copper 
solutions would lH~ held back on plaintiff's property, and 
all members of this eourt agree that plaintiff has tlw 
right at any tinw to mak<~ any diversion or disposition 
of thos<> solutions on plaintiff's property vlaintiff may 
dt>sirP. 'rlmt faet in our opinion preeludes a11y rPal or 
serious int<~ntion on the part of the defendants tlwnl-
selves to tn'a t these solutions." 'rhis has nothing to do 
with tlw <keision of this ease. \Y e have already in this 
bric~r anrl in llw origim1l briefs discussed the souree of 
tlw watn and the possibility of shutting it off. Thi,.; 
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comingled source is at last admitted by n~spondcnt in 
discussing Point V, but it makes no diff(~rence ·what re-
spondent may or may not do in the future. Dcfendm1t'' 
good faith is not open to question, and their expressed 
intention and future conduct vvill determine whether tlw 
inte11tion of the defendants to collect copper solution.-: 
on deft~ndants' property is ''a mere gesture.'' '['he col-
ludion of copper solutions by tlw defendants is not "con-
ting(~nt, unet~rtain or Jll'oblematic," it is absolute and 
eedain. Ev<~r sinee the faet of eomrnercial value in tlw 
eopper solutions in Dixon Gulch has bet~n kno>vn hy tlw 
ddPIHlants they have intended to at onee capture them 
and it is only because of the illegal and unwarranted in-
tnfen·ncn of th<:> plai.ntiff that this has not been done. 
Th<• east~s cited by respoudeni ·with reference to this 
mat Lu r are not in point. 'rtwy refer to the condemnation 
or Jll'OJl<~riy heiug held by a person who was not tiH'il 
using tlw same Jor vuhlic ns<', or where sueh public US<' 
n·asmwllly <~mdd not lw contemplated in thf~ imlllediat(' 
l'utun~. H i\'Otlld l.w interesting to have counsel tind 
sm1w t'a"'' wlwrc a mining company had condemnetl tht• 
lllining gT()tllld of another mining company to remov<· 
tlw value;.; tllerdt·om for mining purpos<)S. The author-
iii(':.; t•il('<l by appl'llaut~ at pages 111 to 119 of "HriPE 
of "\pp<•llants" are direetly in point, and a compll'iP 
au..:'.\'<'1' to this question. 
No question of abandonment hy tlefendants of tht>se 
watr•rs or of forfeiture of their right thereto has ('Ver 
lwen nmde in this ease either by pleading or othPrwi:-:e. 
( ln tht• <·outrary I'('Spo!Hl<'llT has throughout eoneedefl 
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that solutions and waters which were in the premises up 
to the time of their taking by respondent belonged to 
defendants. 
IV. 
Respondent's point IV is the newest thing in the 
petition for rehearing. This is a complet<~ departure 
from the theory upon which plaintiff based its case, 
diametrically opposed to the evidence presented, and 
destructive of any possiblE' re>li<>f for plaintiff in this 
case. 
The point is: 
"If the law of \Va tc~r applies, then it should 
be governed by the law of public waters.'' 
~Why should there he any question as to the law of 
waters applying'! Plaintiff seeks to condemn a ditch 
within whieh to eourse 1Dater·s. If there is any question 
about the law of wat0rs applying, then rP:-;pondent has 
no standing in eou rt at all, beca us<' t lw vt>ry <·ondcenma-
tion al't under whieh plaintiff is s<><~king Jw•onrse has 
to do with waters. 
R0spondeut says thpse arP puhlic water:-;. If, then, 
these are public '"atPrs, rPspond<>nt stan<!:-' in tlw peculiar 
position of seeking to condemn private property for the 
conveyaw·n of pnhlie water:-; in which plaintiff has ab-
solutely no right, title, or interest. 
Both positions a]'(~ wrong. 'l'lw water:-; are privately 
owned s<>Pping mHl pen·olating wat<'rs within cvpry dd-
inition of' tlw lnw, an<l "~ithin tlw llll<''llliTa<li<'f<'d Pvi-
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dence in the case, and respondent i.s now seeking to 
s·witch theories at this late date after having tried the 
case upon the theory that they are privately owned 
waters. 
'\Vhen respondent offered Exhibit 36 (the filing 
with the State Engineer) in evidence (Ab. 199-200) de-
fendants objected upon the ground that it was incom-
petent, irrelevant, and immaterial and not germane to 
any issue in the case; this upon the theory that a mere 
filing meant nothing, and that the filing call<~d for cap-
turing the waters upon respondent's own premises, and 
hence outside of the issues in this case. 
'l'he court thereupon called upon respondent to ex-
plain what it claimed for the papc~r. 'l'hen~upon 1\lr. 
Parsons stated as follows: 
''MR. PARSONS: It is an application to ap-
propriate the waters of this stream and 1 would 
say to your II onor that we do not predicate our 
claim to title to these toaters upon any theor·y that 
they are public waten; or within the jurisdiction 
of the State Enrrineer. I am bringing out by this 
witness that the purpose of this application was 
simply to safeguard the plaintiff's property in 
the event anybody or the State Engineer or the 
Court might rule some day that these waters are 
public ·waters within the State Engineer's juris-
diction and could be appropriated. I understand 
th<~ State EngiiW<~r in one cas<~ involving copper 
waters from these dumps has so held. 
"I will say 1.'C~ry fmnkly that that is not our 
throry of plaintiff's title. In o11r opinion th.cse 
n·aters are not p·ublic tt''aters and are in no way 
within the jurisdiction of the State Engineer." 
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The court did not immediately rule upon the admis-
sibility of the document, so respondent, in an attempt 
to further justify the introduction in evidence of Exhibit 
36 took further evidence, and Mr. Goodrich, chief en-
gineer, testified (Ab. 201): 
"\V" e do not believf~ that the State mngineer 
has jurisdiction oV<\r waters of this C'haracter,'' 
etc. 
~ir. Goodrich further testified ('l'r. 644) that on the 
day previous to giving this evidence thry had filed an 
amendment to the application so as to d1angr th(~ point 
of diversion. The filing had not ripened into any right, 
and the comt (rrr. 690, Ab. 2o:3) snstai11Pd the objection 
of defendants to the admissibility of tlw application for 
any purpose in the ease, from whieh ruling respondtmt 
rwver appPaled. Obviously thf~ eourt was right in sus-
taining the objection lweause the nH•re filing of an ap-
plication mPans nothing in eontemplation of law as a 
hasis of right, the tin1e to eontPst tlw sanw not having 
expin~d, and the appli(·ation hdorn the allH'JH!nwnt was 
fih•d had ahsolutl•ly uothing to do Kith the eas<'. In the 
ahs<\nee, therPfore, of any s<•mhlance of right in any 
public \YatPr, rt-sponflent chmw tlw thPor~, of private 
water, whi<·h was ohviously eorreet. 
This was n~sponflent's th<~ory during t!JP trial, and 
we quote tlw following from "HespondPut's Bri<>f" at 
page 11 to show that this was still their theory npou 
appeal: 
"It must lw fnrtlwr horne in mind that it is 
not llw eontention of eitlwr part)' that any of the 
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waters of Dixon Gulch are public waters or cap-
able of appropriation." 
Having therefore tried the case upon a theory of 
private water and attempted to sustain the judgment 
upon the theory of private water, respondent would 
now in desperation seck to abandon that theory entirely 
and shift to the theory of public \Yater after having ex-
pressly repudiated it, and notwithstanding the fact that 
there is not a vestige of evidence of any title in the 
plaintiff to any public water. 
rrhe deeisions of this eourt are unanimous and uni-
form in holding that litigants cannot try cases upon one 
theory and then shift theories upon appeal, partiwlarly 
in a petition for rehearing. 
H<~spondent was right, however, in conteuding that 
these \Yen~ privately owned wat<'rs, and the decision of 
this comt was right in holding that these are seeping 
and percolating waters, and the evidence of both partiPs 
showed sueh to be the case. rt'here was not <~ven a <•on-
flict upon tlw qu<~stion. 'l'lw following (~XePrpts from the• 
evidence presented by the [T tah Copp0r Company giv<> a 
fair sample of what was provm1 by their own statements: 
PARSONS (Ab. 72) : "And tah the> waters from 
this dump as they seep down the bottom of that gnleh to 
that portion of tlw ~'ll"fa<·<~ of d<,fendants' property ou 
bedrock and above as a medium through which these> 
wat<•rs percolate, for a conduit to eonvey these watPrs *" 
SCIIIT~l~ING, Mining Superintendent (All. 12!)): 
"It is our theory that thPR<' watPrs eseap~~ from thP dmnp 
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up above, and we intend to capture them some hundreds 
of feet below in the Valentine Script." This water seeps 
or finds a course through the railroad fill. (Ab. 1:30). 
The course of the water is unknown. 
H. C. GOODRICH, Chief Engineer (Ab. 136): "We 
expect cPrtain of the water will percolate through the 
portion of the land lying on the right hand side of the 
gulch going up, and they should percolate through all 
the railroad fill." It is my opinion the \Vaters come 
through everywhere in all that area (Tract D). I know 
of no other well defined channel than the entire Tract 
D. (Ab. 141). 
J .. J. BEASON, geologist (Ab. 501): rl'hese copper 
solutions (~VPntually percolat<> through a SPuli-impPrviouR 
s<>al at the toe of the dump. The waters percolate down-
ward through that and into thE~ fill and ppn•olate out 
through tlw fill, and th(~y n~acll the bottom of tlw gulch. 
(A h. :l02). rrhis extends ano~s the entire Up\Yanl to<~ 
of the fill. I know of no particular chanrwl in which 
theRe wat<>rs eonrse down through the fill. TheRe waters 
are sPeping and p<~rcolating in the fill, in the soil bc>-
n<•ath tlw fill, aml above lH~drock. I observed the water 
ywrcolation between bedrock and the collar of the raisP 
in thP eatehment tmmE'l. (Ah. ;)03). That is the sanw 
general eharader o!" wat<>r sc·C>pagn a]l(l percolation 
which I bav<' desnilwd in m~· <•vidPlWe an<l iR tlw way 
tlw wat<>r 1<>aves the dump and comes down to thP point 
wher<' it aeenmnlatc>s for thP making of tlw lla~·s Rpri11p;. 
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GEORGljj C. EARL (All. 463): I also believr that 
the water is spread out over a considerable area. I do 
not believe myself this \\'atPr comes down the bottom of 
that gulch. (Ab. 464) By that I mean that the wat(~r 
percolates lat(~rally as well as pc'rpendienlarly down-
ward. 
Defendants' witnesses were to the same effeet. They 
all testified that if any solutions whatsoever arriv~01l 
into defendants' ground from respondent's dump in 
Dixon Gulch that it did so by seepage and percolation. 
The occasional use of the~ word ''flow'' did not ehange 
the eharacter of the water. 1\'o one ch~seribed any ehan-
n(~l other than the entire gulch. 
\Vith n~fc>renr(~ to the findings of fart rPferrPd to 
on page 35 of n~spondent's pdition it will he ob~wrve<l 
that plaintiff has italiri11ed the word "flowed" but has 
entirely ignored the \vonl "percolated," which also ap-
pears in tlw findings. 
Tlw ease of Chandlc>r \', Utah Copper Company has 
absolutely nothing to do with this ease. 'l'hat was a clem· 
examph~ of an und('J'gronnd stream, having all of thP 
eharaeteristies of current, dinwnsion, banks, bed, and 
eomingling of th<' waier partieles, which characterist.ies 
an~, as stat<'d by the majority opinion in this case, en-
tirely ahst>nt from this watc>r oreurrf'nee which the Utah 
Copp<'r Company is sc(:kiug to takP. \Ve have ahen<l,:: 
diseussPd the so-C'alled Pxperiments by the pouring ()_· 
water upon the dumps. 'l'his entire subject matter wn : 
handlc>ll in appellants' rPply brief, em1mwneing at page 
4!J. 
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v. 
Point V has been thrashed over so often that it 
deserves no extended attention. It is noticeable that 
plaintiff has the solemn presumption of manufacturing 
its own fads and then quoting the alleged facts as au-
thority. On page 4G this effort on the part of the plain-
tiff to support the plaintiff occurs. "The dump has 
been frequently described as a huge spong~~ or reser-
voir." By \Yhom "? All of this talk about artificial pro-
duetion amounts only to this, that defendants threw out 
in the gulches a lot of material that they ~wanted to get 
rid of and the rains descended and the floods came. 
'l'hey would have come and descended had the plaintiff 
never done anything. And as time passed on coppN 
solutions appeared, and now the plaintiff contends that 
the produet is an artificial and manufactured one. It 
might just as well be contended by the eity administra-
tion that tlw gases from the municipal garbage heap art> 
artificial increments added to the atmosphc•re. This 
~whole matter is discussed at the following places in 
briefs heretofore filed and then~ is nothing in the dis-
cussion under this point in plaintiff's petition for n~­
hearing that is in any way nmv, interesting, or convinc-
ing: "Respondent's Reply," pagc•s lG-18, 22-2i), "Ap-
pellants' ll<'ply to Respondt>nt 's Reply," pages 1-12. 
Tlw nitieism of the opinion of thc~ eomt that thc~ 
statement in the majority opinion that the plaintiff has 
auclPu no wat<~r to Dixon Gulch is childish and inac-
curate. \Yhat the court manifestly mPmls is tl1at the 
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plaintiff has brought no nevv stream of water into the 
water shed in Dixon Gulch. It has no reference to the 
piddling experiments performed by the plaintiff during 
the course of the trial and referred to on page 43 in tlw 
petition for rehearing. 
A complete reversal of the position of the plaintiff 
will also be noticed on the question of whether or not 
there were always waters in Dixon Gulch. On the trial 
plaintiff insisted that Dixon Gulch was bone dry until 
plaintiff established its dump, and thPn the dump be-
camP a res<>rvoir. Now plain tiff takes the position that 
waters have always flowed in Dixon Gulch. It is inter-
esting to note the inconsistency of the position that there 
have always been waters in Dixon Gulch, with the for-
mer suggestion that th<~ waters all originate in the 
dump. 'l'h<> truth of the matter is that there was always 
some water in Dixon Gnleh, both b<~fore and since tlw 
dump has he<m established, and it is also true that tlw 
plaintiff has added no new water to Dixon Gulch. The 
dumping of waste material by the plaintiff in Dixon 
Gulch has slowed up the runoff, but the total amount of 
water has not been incn~ased by mw drop. 
For the purpose of this point counsel for respon-
dent s<~eks to shift theories by blandly stating now smne-
thing which they have hen~tofore denied, to-wit, that 
there wen~ "·aters in Dixon Gulch before respondent's 
dumps wen~ placed thc>n~, and htmce all of the waters in 
Dixon Gulch and within •rracts C and D could not pos-
sibly han~ come from their dump. vVe beg leave to quote 
tll<' foll<w;ing from Mr. Parsons (Ab. 206): 
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"MR. PARSONS : (Tract D is a natural 
channel) For conveying the water from our dump. 
I will concede, if there be any-I cannot conceive 
of the possibility of being any waters that do not 
come from our dump-if there be any we cannot 
take them in this proceeding.'' 
It therefore seems to us that counsel, by admitting 
the facts stated in the argument upon this point, and by 
relying thereon-trying to draw the cloak of developed 
water over themselves-that they admit having played 
a trick upon the trial court, which found as a fact-but 
which was not a faet-upon the insistence of respondent, 
that all the waters in Dixon Gulch come from the dump. 
By making this argument they bring themselves 
squarely within thn doctrine relating to comingled waters 
discussed by defendants in'' Brief for Appellants,'' eom-
mencing at page 128. 
VI. 
Under this point the plaintiff again att(•mpts to 
mislead the eourt as to the exad nature of Tracts C and 
D and as to the position whic-h the defendants have> 
alu:ays tak(m as to the::w trac·ts. 'rraets C and D are 
ncecssary, vital, and indispensable to the activity of the 
deft>ndants if they are to have any use of their property 
in Dixon Gulch. This Tract C is tlH~ plae(• wh~\re all 
waters passing through Tract D arc gathered into re-
spondent's pipeline. (See the Pvidenee of Chief I1~ngi­
HPC'r Goodrieh, Abs. 146). 'J'ract C is not necess,ary to 
plaintiff. The drain tunnrl wat(\l'S can be piped acros:,; 
'l'raet D and taken into the pipelinP on Trac·t H thu 
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same as the waters from Tract A after amendment of 
the complaint requesting such right as heretofore grant-
ed by this court, so as to avoid the comingling of de-
fendants' and plaintiff's waters on Tract C. The same 
thing is true with regard to the pipeline over Tracts A 
and B which convey waters from outside the drainagf~ 
area in Dixon Gulch. The defendants have no objection 
to the plaintiff condemning Tract A, except that the 
plaintiff cannot Hnder the guise of condemning Tract A 
dump the U)aters from the pipe on Tract A into the catch-
ment at Tract C, and then claim plaintiff's waters from 
T'ract A and defendants' waters making in Tracts C and 
D with which they would be mingled, when it is entirely 
possible and just as con11enient for the plaintiff to con-
tinue its pipe down the .rJulch instead of dumping at catch-
ment C. Defendants have no objection to plaintiff con-
veying waters from the drain tunnel and from outside the 
drainage area of Dixon Gnlch through pipes which en-
close such water before entering plaintiff's property 
down to the mouth of Dixon Gulch, but they do ohjeet to 
plaintiff misleading the court as to the character of Tract 
C and Tract D. These tracts are ahsolntc:>ly indispensable 
to the exereise of defendants' rights. Dc:>fendants cannot 
collect the waters in any other place than in these tracts. 
They were purposely selected because they are the only 
places that defendants' waters may be collected in Dixon 
Gulch. They are not at all essential to the plaintiff ex-
cept as their use would absolutely destroy the possibility 
of the defendants collecting their own copper solutions. 
'l'he opinion of the P<mrt on this point is correct. 
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VII. 
As far as point seven is eoncerned there is so murh 
error and so little facts or law in it, and there is so 
much of an att0mpt to lead the court into possible future 
contingenries not no\v before the court that the discus-
sion thereof is premature and futile, to say the 
least. The suit for condemnation is an entirety, and is 
conclusive upon the issues presented, namely, as to 
whether Trarts C and D can he rondemned for the pur-
poses claimed. If it operates at all it operates from the 
dah~ of its filing. 'J'he wPircl suggestion that while the 
action of the court may be right in denial of the plain-
tiff's right to condemn 'J'ract D for the collection of 
solutions up to the clatP of filing rPspondc~nt 's petition 
for rehearing that such a conclusion should in no wa~­
affect the right of the plaintiff to collect solutions in 
'l'ract D for the next hundred years, has the prize for 
originality. 'Phe suggestion that the court has pointed 
out how the plaintiff may legally arctuin~ 'J'nwt D is in-
accurate. No one has ever contended that as to bon<' 
dry ground the plaintiff may not rondemn sneh gron11d 
through \vhieh to run a ditch or in which to lay a pipe to 
ronvey coppt~r solutions from plaintiff's dump to it:-< 
prPeipitating plant. But this view do<~s not originatP 
with the Supreme Court. ThPre is nothing novel or nPw 
about it. Such a usc of Dixon Guleh is already heinr~· 
ma(le as far as 'J'rad A and tlw drain tunnel waters arc 
eoneerrH•d, lmt it is when tlw plaintiff eontends for a 
right to coll('ct thP d<'fC'1Hlants' coppN ;.;olntions in t1l<' 
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defendants' premises without paying for their value or 
to prevent the defendants from collecting such solutions 
by occupying the only ground in which they can be col-
lected without paying for the damage plaintiff wonlrl 
then~by do, that objection is made. 
It is not true that the only issue raised is as to the 
right of respondent to condemn the land of the defen-
dants. ']'he further answer and counterclaim of defen-
dants is eontained in paragraph XXXIII, stating among 
other things as follows : 
" * * * that the said plaintiff is now appropriating· 
and taking waters belonging to this defendant and for a 
period of about two weeks prior to the comnwncmnent of 
this action has so talwn the same, ·without dcfL'IHlauts' 
consent and to the damage of this defendant to the ex-
tent of several thousand dollars, and for all of which 
said vYatm·s containing copper in solution taken and ap-
propriated or h<~reaftpr taken and appropriated by the 
plaintiff from this defendant, the defendant demand~~ 
an aerounting and payment for the value of such copp<'l' 
in solution, as a part of d<~fendants' further damages." 
(Abs. 63) 'rlw prayer of the answer properly demanded 
affirmatin) relief. \rlwther this allegation and prayer 
amounts to a counterclaim is not now before this eourt, 
but the reeord shows affirmatively that it was treated by 
the parties and Hw b·i:1l eonrt as a emmtereiaim, and it 
c0rtainly contaius all of th<~ elements of a cause of action 
for unlawfully taking dPfendants' waters and if deJ'i-
ci<~nt in any respert is subject to the same right of 
aJJJendiJWnt as is aerordnd to respondent. The rrwmor-
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andum opinion of thE~ trial judge contains the follmving: 
"Because of the contention of the defendants to the ef-
fect that they are entitled to an accounting of all thP 
waters collected by plaintiff during the pendency of the 
suit ·whether the sonree thereof is in plaintiff's dump 
or not, this expression of the opinion of the court is 
voiced at this point," etc., ete., (Abs. 589). It is quite 
evident that the trial court regarded the pleading of dE~­
fendants as a counterclaim demanding an accounting of 
values taken by respondent. 
It is a new contention that a condemnation snit 
which has no merit and in "·hich the eondPmrwr has been 
required to file a bond and in which the defendants aft0r 
denying the plaintiff's right to eondenm, ask for dam-
ages because of the unlawful taking of defPndants' prop-
erty, are confined in the action merely to a determinn 
tion of the issue as to ·whether or not there is a right 
to condemn. Respondent says, ''title to waters presento-~ 
no issue in the present aspect of this case." (Petition 
for rehearing, page 58). From the V(~ry start the qn0s-
tion of title to waters was insisted upon as the is~nw. In 
his opening statement and in the statenH-mts of issues 
which oeemTed thereafter at the very outset, on page 7D 
of the ahstraet, ·will be found a statement by eounsel of 
respondent as follows: "That qm~stion must be deter-
mined by the court. If vve do not own that wat(~r tlwre 
I do not know very well how \YC eould take theirs." On 
page 89 of the abstraet will be found the following re-
marks by the same counsf~l: ''They (the defendants) 
have rais(•d this issue, this is in their pl(•adings, they 
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have set out as a defense to the action in challenging 
our right to condemn, that these waters we seek to re-
cover are theirs, and that we have no property there to 
recover. * * * Now, in calling upon your Honor to de-
termine those questions, incidentally your Honor will 
pass upon the title, of course, which we submit is a 
question for the court and not a question for a jury, that 
once your Honor has determined that question, the issue 
can then readily be framed, that is to ultimately go to 
the jury, but once determined by the court, of course the 
jury will not be called upon again to determine it.'' To 
whieh counsel for the defendants replied: "That is ex-
actly what I thought; the question they are trying to 
present to your Honor and have your Honor dc•termine 
is the facts as to title.'' 
The~ suggestion that plaintiff may as a physical 
possibility capture~ solutions in its own dump, is an in-
ten~sting one hut not a legal one in this casP, and is 
probably intended to disturb someone. rrhis adion has 
only to do with the right of respondcmt to take defen-
dants' property for the purpose of rapturing waters at 
that point. 
VIII. 
It seems to us that the insertion of this point is 
rather a belated effort on the part of respondent to in-
jed a Fc~deral question into the case in the hope that 
this ''bogeyman'' might tcmd to frighten someone. 
As we~ understand this attemptc~d point it is: That 
sine<' clc•fpndants did not sePk to qnic~t title by way of 
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counterclaim that the question of title was not in the 
case, and this court having found title to these waters to 
be in defendants, such finding has no foundation in the 
pleadings and is null and void; and hence subject to 
reversal by some Federal court to which respondent 
threatens to appeal if this court does not conform to 
respondent's desires. Apparently counsel for respondent 
thinks that the only cases in which the question of title 
to property is presented are suits to quiet title. Title is 
involved in practically every case involving propert~· 
rights, and is particularly involved in condemnation 
cases where defendants question the right to condemn 
and in this case title is in isstw because the \Vaters for 
which plaintiff is seeking a ditch right do not belong 
to the condemner, and here also the condemner is SPE~k­
ing, without compensation or damages, to take \Vaters 
belonging to defendants. 
'rhe question of title is squarely within the issues 
presented by the pleadings. It was raised in paragraph 
XI, XII, XIII of the answer, and in the further answer 
and eounterc~laim in paragraph XXXIII; togdher also 
with the various denials sc~t forth in <lE~fendants' answPI' 
(Ab. 42-64). 
'rhc~ question of title was the first thing we ran into 
in the trial of the~ case, plaintiff insisting that the ques-
tion of title was one for the court, and def(~ndants, on 
tlw other hand, insisting that they were entitled to a 
jury trial; and both parties agreeing that it was the 
paramount issue in the ease. (Ab. 76-92) Aftpr having 
insistPd that the qm~stion of title to thc'se \YatPrs \\'as 
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included within the matters and things to be found by 
the court as a necessary element under the statute, it 
comes with rather poor grace at this late date to urge 
that the court transcended the issues in determining 
title. A typical example of counsel's contention is con-
tained at page 79 of the abstract: 
''MR. PARSONS: My notion about this 
thing is our opponents are entitled to a jury trial 
only upon one question, that is the question of 
damages, the value of the right-of-way and the 
damage to the ground due to the taking. The 
q1testion of the title of the water I think goes to 
the right of eminent domain. That question must 
be detennined by the court. If we do not owr~ that 
water the1·e I do not know 11ery well hmP we co1tld 
take theirs." 
In fact both parties agn~ed that this '''as the para-
mount issue in the ease. 
The suggestion on pagc; G4 that mrhat court could 
properly indulge only om~ presumption, namely, that 
plaintiff would do whatever might be necessary to pre-
serve its title as its eopper solutions crossed the bound-
ary behn~en the respective propc~rties of the parties to 
this actio11, that with the changing times and conditions 
ami metallurgical processes waters and chemical solu-
tions from new sources might, and in all probability 
wonld, be sprayed upon plaintiff's dumps in Dixon Gulch 
and that it was reasonablc~ to presume that th(~ easement 
sought to be condemned across Tract C not only could, 
but would be used for the purpose for "\vhich it was to be~ 
c•oJHlPnuwd, nanwly, thC' tnmsportation of coppc•r Roln-
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tions produced by plaintiff in plaintiff's reduction works 
by whatever process or processes the then state of the 
art might indicate, and that therefore, the judgment 
should be affirmed,'' should he set off against the equal-
ly emphatic statement of respondent in respondent's 
reply to appellants' reply, page 6, ~where it is stated that 
"plaintiff cannot in the case at bar drive a tunnel he-
neath the top of bedrock to intercept by its raise and 
wings plaintiff's copper solutions at plaintiff's bound-
ary, because such diverting structures under the circum-
stances there existing would not only be prohibitive m 
initial cost but would be impossible of maintenanrP at 
any cost.'' 
Respondent blows hot and eold upon this issue, as 
it has upon practically <~very other issue in the case. If 
their good faith is questioned upon the ground that it 
will be a simple matter for them to take their O\Yn water 
upon their own lands and premises and leave the lands 
and premises of the d<~fendants alone, they say it is an 
impossibility to collect their own waters upon their own 
lands and premises. On Uw otlwr hand, if they desire 
to argue our good faith in seeking to capture these wat-
ers, they state that it will be a "mere gesture" for 1h<'m 
to shut the solutions off. 
In faee of this assertion of physical impossibilit~ 
to collPd <'Opper solutions in plaintiff's dump, plaintiff's 
own theory under point eight and at other places in 
plaintiff's brief that the court will not require the mere 
"gesture" of a compliance with the law, dissolves into 
thin air. H is Pmphatieally 11ot tme, as tlu• respond<•nt 
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has stated in its petition on page 65 that "This case war: 
tried on the theory that if there were no solutions other 
than those defendants had alleged were coming to the 
surface at the Hays Spring out of the synclinal basin 
from subterranean sources,'' etc. '11he case was tried on 
that theory and also on the theory that wherever the 
waters came from when they reached defendants' lands, 
if collected by defendants, they belonged absolutely to 
d(~fendants. 
'rhe two Utah cases ref(~rred to on page 65 of 
Respondent's Petition are in no way in point. In the 
case at G6 Utah G3 it was held that \vlwre the right to 
condemn is sustained, that in such action th(~ d(~fendant 
may not recover judgnwnt on a eounterelaim for an in-
dependent tn~spass eornmitted by the condemner prior 
to the condemnation proct•edings. In the speond caS(' at 
22 Utah 4:3, it was held that where an aetion is brought 
for an injunetion to restrain a trespass, the trPspass may 
not be justified on the ground that it was em1m1ittc•d for 
a public purpose or that a right of condemnation ex-
'isted unexercised in the trespasser, and that condemn-
ation may not b(~ prayt-d for in a eonnterelaim in sueh 
action. It seems to us manifest that the principle of these 
cas(~S does not apply where, as in this ease, the right to 
condemn is denied and there remains, therefore, nothing 
for the eonrt to do hut to assess tlw damagP donp hy thP 
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condemner during his unwarranted and unlawful pos-
session of the premises of the defendants. If respondent 
by these two cases is attempting to mah the point that 
a counterclaim of this kind is not properly pleadable in 
this action, then we respectfully suggest that there is a 
proper way for respondent to raise that -point in the trial 
court, and if the ruling is not satisfactory to respondent 
they have a right of appeal u-pon that question. This 
particular phase of the case is not now before this court. 
'l'he only point whieh is raised is as to whether the ques-
tion of title was within the issues raised hy the pleadings 
and as to this we respectfully urge that it was within 
the issues raised by the am;wer, furtlwr answer, and 
eounterclaim. 
rrhe authorities qnoh~d on pagl's 67 to 70 that the 
eourt is bound in its determination to the isstws raisc>d 
in the pleadings have no point in this case as herdofore 
poi11ted out. 'l'he plaintiff sought to eondenm and de-
fendants deui(~d the right to eondemn and asked for 
damages because of the unlawful taking of the eoppcr 
solutions owned hy the defendants. All of thc>sc issues 
were properly in the pleadings and eovcn•d by the judg-
ment of thl' trial court and properly eovpred by a re-
versal of the determination of tht" trial court and a re-
manding of the action for a determination of the (lamage 
don(~ thc> dPfcndants. 
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IN e respectfully submit that notwithstanding the 
disappointment of our brothers on the other side, the 
conclusion reached by the court in the carefully consid-
ered opinion filed in this case was the only one that 
could be reached in accordance with the facts and the 
la,v, and that the petition for rehearing should be denied. 
Respectfully submitted, 
BADGER, RICH & RICH ancl 
BADGER & LOvVRY, 
Attorneys for Defendants and Appellants. 
